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 Options for climate smart agriculture in Malawi get mixed responses from farmers 
 A discrete choice experiment reveals that farmers prefer crops for local use 
 Conditional payments as adoption incentives may exclude certain farmers 
 Options vary in poverty reduction, drought adaptation and commercialisation 
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The promotion of climate smart agriculture (CSA) techniques to increase farmer resilience 
against climate change and their livelihoods is high on the international development agenda 
and aims to help achieve Sustainable Development Goals of food security (SDG 2), climate 
resilience and mitigation (SDG 13). We present the results of a discrete choice experiment 
(DCE) conducted in face-to-face interviews. In a study in Malawi, farmers responded to a 
series of questions about different cropping techniques and tree planting options to improve 
soil fertility and climate change resilience. A combination of financial and non-financial 
incentives was proposed to increase adoption and success rates. The results show that for 
different policy objectives, different climate smart packages are suitable. Our results 
demonstrate that farmers prefer options that secure the production of maize and include crops 
with both domestic use and local markets. The drought-resistant crop sorghum was unpopular 
among respondents; achieving SDG 13 through this CSA approach would therefore require 
high incentive payments. If CSA is to help achieve multiple goals e.g. poverty and inequality 
reduction (SDGs 1 and 10) as well as SDGs 2 and 13, a range of CSA packages, with 
different types of crops, rotation versus intercropping techniques and incentive levels, should 




1. Introduction - Climate smart agriculture and adoption 
Globally, there are an estimated 500 million smallholder farms, who produce 75% of all food 
(Lowder et al. 2016), yet many smallholders live below the international income poverty line. 
Widespread calls for radical changes in the current food and agriculture system (e.g. TEEB 
2018) towards sustainable agricultural intensification (Rockström et al. 2017) have been 
motivated by damage to biodiversity and ecosystems – with estimated costs of up to 18% of 
global economic output by 2050, up from around 3.1% (US$2 trillion) in 2008 (UNPRI 
2017). The food and agriculture system is therefore considered as one of the four biggest 
opportunities for SDG investment for business and governments (ibid.).  
Several international development organisations, including the World Bank and the FAO, 
have adopted Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA), as the main strategy for sustainable 
agriculture driven development to support food security under climate change (Lipper et al. 
2014). These organisations, who have set up networks with large private sector agents but 
also work with local stakeholders, try to promote CSA practices and its recognition in policy. 
CSA aims to improve farmer incomes and livelihoods, increase farmer resilience to climate 
change, and where possible reduce greenhouse gas emissions from farming. The set of CSA 
techniques include off- and on-farm techniques, covering multiple steps in the agricultural 
commodity chain.  
There is an intense debate across stakeholder groups about the advantages and disadvantages 
of sustainable intensification and CSA. Proponents argue that poor and non-farming 
households benefit from agricultural development through higher food availability, lower 
prices and labour opportunities (Gómez et al. 2011). Arguably, CSA and intensification 
practices provide win-wins (Waldron et al. 2017) and help to reduce emissions globally by 
reducing forest and woodland conversion (Burney et al. 2010). The introduction of new crops 
and tree planting may help to increase farm revenue, climate resilience, soil fertility 
(Akinnifesi et al. 2011) and reduce deforestation (Kaczan et al. 2013). 
Critics question the socio-political dimension of CSA, the emphasis on technology rather 
than political reform, and on win-wins rather than trade-offs in complex systems (Taylor 
2018, Whitfield et al. 2018). Civil society organisations have published their concerns about 
CSA leading up to the COP21 and reject the Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture 
(GACSA). They argue that CSA is a re-branding of industrial practices, some of which may 
help to adapt to climate change, but which increase dependencies on corporations without 
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respecting ecological boundaries and local culture, knowledge and skills. They claim that 
private sector projects often fail to engage the poorest farmers or take their land (Rosset 
2011).  
Others warn against win-win thinking. Evaluations of existing projects have found that 
projects fail to deliver on social and ecological goals simultaneously (Zeng et al. 2014, 
Rasmussen et al. 2018). Successful implementation require agricultural extension services 
and appropriate institutions (Coulibaly et al. 2015). Rosenstock et al. (2015) find that win-
wins (synergies) between resilience and yield improvements are found in just over half the 
CSA studies.  
Moreover, sustainable agricultural practices, including agroforestry and conservation 
agriculture (Pittelkow et al. 2015), have seen little to no sustained adoption among 
smallholder farmers (Nebraska Declaration 20131, Corbeels et al. 2014) and have very mixed 
effects on the wellbeing of farmers (Pannell et al. 2014, Rasmussen et al. 2018). Preliminary 
results of a meta-analysis on CSA adoption did not reveal any systematic impacts of factors 
on adoption (Rosenstock et al. 2015). This finding holds for gender, credit and market access, 
information and extension, assets, social networks, and off-farm income – these factors were 
statistically insignificant in 70% or more of the studies. The low adoption rates have also 
been attributed to insecure tenure rights, limited information and high upfront investment 
costs; factors which have hindered agricultural development in general for decades (Williams 
et al. 2015). In some cases, farmers with larger farm sizes and higher education were more 
likely to adopt conservation agriculture (Knowler and Bradshaw 2007), while lack of access 
to farm inputs reduces adoption rates (Giller et al. 2011). However, land (tenure) and income 
constraints are most likely to reduce the accessibility of CSA techniques to the poorest and 
most vulnerable segments of society. Project designs to increase adoption rates have had little 
effect. Projects that have used so-called ‘lead-farmers’, i.e. farmers who are most likely to 
adopt first get investment support and are stimulated to demonstrate their success and spread 
adoption through their social networks, have had limited success (Steenwerth et al. 2014). 
This is despite ethnographic findings that peer-effects play a role in uptake decisions (Bell et 
al. 2018). Other projects have provided inputs such as chemical fertiliser for free to increase 
initial adoption. However, if such inputs are no longer supplied after the projects end, dis-
adoption of the promoted agricultural techniques has often followed (Andersson and D’Souza 
                                                          
1 Available from: https://ispc.cgiar.org/publication/nebraska-declaration-conservation-agriculture 
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2014). The reason of dis-adoption may be that farmers cannot consistently realise high yields 
from conservation agriculture, and the application of additional chemical fertiliser is often 
necessary to generate acceptable yield levels (Corbeels et al. 2014; Vanlauwe et al. (2013). 
Without free inputs, farmers cannot bear the additional costs of conservation agriculture. 
The question is to what extent a CSA strategy can contribute directly to the Sustainable 
Development Goals 1 (no poverty) and 10 (reduced inequalities) (Karlsson et al. 2018). In 
light of these pressing goals but the mixed evidence, a clear demand for enhancing the 
evidence base for strategic choices towards successful CSA implementation has been 
expressed (Williams et al. 2015). As public investment in agriculture is showing a steady 
decline (-40% between 2000 and 2015)2, evidence from context-sensitive studies (Giller et al. 
2015) should ensure that development resources are invested in agricultural development 
projects that can deliver on their promise of improving the livelihoods of smallholder 
farmers.  
The aim of this study was to understand whether preference for on-farm climate-smart 
agricultural projects would vary with individual wealth and wellbeing levels. In a discrete 
choice experiment, we elicited farmers’ preferences for a program combining on-farm tree 
planting and crop diversification, supported by a conditional payment to overcome the initial 
investment cost as a risk-sharing mechanism (Mapfumo et al. 2015). More specifically, we 
asked farmers to make choices about the adoption of extra trees on their farms with different 
tree products, different cropping techniques, the level of credit they would want, and different 
maize yield increases following tree planting and intercropping or crop rotation after a certain 
period of time. We test whether the conditional preference parameters of the DCE attributes 
are associated with indicators for different types of capital (physical, human, financial, social 
and natural), using a seemingly unrelated regression model.  
 
2. Existing climate smart agriculture initiatives in Malawi 
We conducted our empirical research in the Zomba district in Southern Malawi. Poverty 
levels in Malawi are high: the country ranks 170 on the Human Development Index 2016, 
with 56% of the total population qualified as multidimensionally poor and 71% living below 
                                                          
2 Available at: http://www.fao.org/sustainable-development-goals/indicators/2a1/en/ 
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the $1.90/day poverty line (HDR 2016). The Southern Region has the highest poverty rate 
(63%) and ultra-poverty rate (34%) (NSO 2012).  
The economy of Malawi is largely dependent on agriculture, in terms of GDP and even more 
so in terms of employment and informal economy. Agriculture is the main source of rural 
livelihoods and half of the rural households are pure subsistence farmers. The average 
cultivated area per household is about 0.6 ha (NSO 2017a). Besides agriculture, local poor 
households depend on multiple forest resources for their livelihoods (Kamanga et al. 2010). 
Stakeholders at national level, especially in urban areas, want to maintain forests for water 
provision and hydropower, but their demand for timber and fuelwood also leads to 
continuous forest degradation. The level of deforestation varies within the Zomba district, 
with denser forest patches remaining in the North, the Zomba-Malosa forest, and high levels 
of deforestation near Zomba, caused mainly by charcoal production for urban dwellers 
(Smith et al. 2015).  
National self-sufficiency in maize is a priority of the Government of Malawi. The 
Government interferes in the maize market through input subsidies, price fixing, domestic 
trade limitations and import and export bans. Ellis and Manda (2012) argue that these 
interventions may have increased price spikes on the black maize market that have caused 
hunger among a large proportion of people. Despite subsidies, fertilisers are still expensive, 
farmers do not have access to loans and other financial services (Lea and Hanmer 2009), and 
market infrastructure is underdeveloped (Dorward et al. 2009, Tchale and Keyser 2010). The 
farmer input subsidies have been criticised for failing to increase maize yields and to alleviate 
poverty as they were not distributed at the right time and to the right people (Lunduka et al. 
2013, Pauw et al. 2016); and for causing fraud, corruption and distortion of the market for 
agricultural inputs (World Bank 2013). The fertiliser coupons are insufficient and fail to 
reach the poorest (Denning et al. 2009, Lunduka et al. 2013). The emphasis on maize and 
subsidies has taken up so much of the government budget for agriculture that it causes 
underinvestment in agricultural diversification and technological development (Dorward et 
al. 2009; Chinsinga and Cabral 2010; Chinsinga 2014). Moreover, maize promotion may 
have negatively affected public perception of alternative cereals such as millet and sorghum 
which are seen as inferior, crops for the desperate (Chinsinga et al. 2011). In addition, besides 
soil loss, climate change is putting increasing pressure on farmers in Malawi. Both droughts 
and floods have had devastating impacts on food security in the country (Stevens and Madani 
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2016). Climate change may increase maize production in some areas in the short-term, but 
this will increase the rate of soil loss (ibid.). 
In response, several organisations in Malawi have trialled climate-smart, agroforestry and 
conservation agriculture practices (Gilbert 2012, Carsan et al. 2014), but with mixed levels of 
success. Agroforestry studies in Malawi have reported increased yields compared to 
unfertilised mono-cropping (Ajayi et al. 2011), and higher farm revenues through tree 
product sales (Akinnifesi et al. 2008), improved resilience to climate change (Verchot et al. 
2007) and food security (Snapp et al. 2010). However, lack of land and knowledge about 
agroforestry practices mean that farmers do not prioritise agroforestry (Cromwell et al. 2001). 
Poverty can also limit the adoption of trees on farmland, when farmers are not willing to 
invest scarce resources in trees which have delayed benefits and involve risks of food 
insecurity and technological failure (Walker 2004; Kamanga et al. 2010; Jerneck and Olsson 
2014; Meijer et al. 2015). Land scarcity, lack of tree seeds and seedlings, tree theft and low 
tree survival rates were reported in focus groups discussing agroforestry (Meijer et al. 2015). 
Support to invest in agroforestry through microfinance has therefore been put forward as a 
possible way to increase adoption and success rates (ibid.). 
Short-term benefits are hence important for adoption of on-farm trees and other sustainable 
farming options, especially in the context of Malawi with high subsistence farming rates. 
Farmers are most likely to adopt legume intercropping systems with crops that fulfil 
immediate food needs or have easy market access, such as pigeon peas (Sirrine et al. 2010, 
Waldman et al. 2017), and more likely to adopt improved grains than non-grain legumes 
(Pircher et al. 2013). Intercropping maize with legumes may be more beneficial and less risky 
than rotation of these crops (Kamanga et al. 2010).  
If sustainable techniques do not generate short-term net-benefits, external incentives may be 
necessary for adoption. In dry low-elevation areas, yields under conservation agriculture have 
been found to increase compared to high-elevation areas and control settings, suggesting that 
farmers in high-elevation areas may need considerably higher incentives for some of the 
conservation agriculture techniques (Ngwira et al. 2013). Agroforestry may also need short-
term subsidies, because the number of trees necessary to improve maize yields takes up land 
while the improvement of soil properties takes multiple years, which therefore may mean that 
farmers have to forego yields in the initial years (Sirrine et al. 2010). Other labour and capital 
costs of agroforestry also tend to be higher in the short-term: maize agroforestry is more 
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labour-intensive than conventional maize cropping during the first two years, when the 
management of the saplings and tree growth requires considerable attention (Garrity et al. 
2010). However, there are few studies that have investigated whether and what level of 
subsidies farmers perceive to be necessary to offset their opportunity costs.  
 
3. Methods 
3.1 Discrete choice experiments 
This study uses a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to elicited farmers’ preferences for a 
climate-smart agricultural program to understand whether preference for on-farm agricultural 
projects would vary with individual wealth and wellbeing levels. DCEs are useful for 
eliciting values when no functioning markets exist in which farmers reveal their preferences 
for CSA. Instead, DCE rely on hypothetical markets to analyse the welfare effects of policies. 
This can inform decisions on investment in CSA, especially if the flow of benefits of 
different CSA options can be compared against their costs (Thornton et al. 2018). 
In the standard economic model of rational choice in decision making, individuals are 
assumed to maximise their utility by determining what options are available and then 
choosing the most preferred one. The DCE is a method in which respondents are asked to 
indicate their preference among two or more multi-attribute alternatives; the value of these 
alternatives can be associated with changes beyond existing markets or conditions (Johnston 
et al. 2017). In a DCE, respondents are usually asked to complete a sequence of choice sets, 
which each consists of two or more options, together with an opt-out option. 
The DCE data can be used to estimate discrete choice models. In the random utility 
framework which underlies the DCE technique, utility is comprised of a systematic 
component Vint and an error term εint, formalized in the following basic relationship:  
Uint = Vint + εint 
Vint is the deterministic component of the utility and can be specified as linear function of 
parameters where a respondent n chooses option i out of a set of options J in choice situation 





𝑈𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝜃𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑡 
         = ∑ (𝛼𝑖 + 𝜎𝑖𝑛
𝛼 )𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑖=1,2









is the vector of parameters to estimate and the matrix X summarizes observable variables. 
Ai is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the two alternative policies, and 0 for the 
opt-out, and α is the mean parameter of these alternative specific constants. The attributes xknt 
of matrix X are portioned in k random coefficients β across respondents (n) and in the 
remaining fixed coefficients. Both alternative specific constants and random parameters are 
normally distributed with standard deviation parameters . The component of respondent 
n’s utility that cannot be observed is denoted by εint and distributed as extreme value type I. 
The parameter α, and its normal random distribution, characterise an error-component model 
that can accommodate correlation among alternatives to reflect that less familiar hypothetical 
alternatives are compared with the current situation (Brownstone and Train 1998; Scarpa et 
al. 2005). The random component model is defined by the parameters β and  and allows for 
heterogeneous preferences within the sampled population, unrestricted substitution patterns 
and correlation between the different aspects of utility (Train 2009).  
Choices are a function of the probability that the utility of option i is higher than for the other 
alternatives. In the mixed logit model, the choice probability function is described as the 
integral of the conditional individual probabilities over all possible choice variables and their 





)𝑓(𝜃|Φ))𝑑𝜃 for all i≠j. 
Because the unconditional probability of the sequence of observed choices (i.e. t = 1; 2; … 6) 
has no closed form, the probability needs to be approximated through simulation by factoring 
out the random and error component coefficients over the standard normal distributions. This 
model specification can also account for the panel structure of the data. 
The estimates of the coefficient vector indicate the average utility weights of the attributes 
included in the choice tasks. The willingness to pay value or the implicit price for each non-
price attribute z can be calculated as WTP = − βz / βp where βz and βp represent the (mean of 
the distribution of the) coefficients of the z-th attribute and of the price attribute respectively. 
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With the estimates of the coefficient vector it is also possible to derive individual-specific 
(conditional) WTP measures (Train 2009). These post-estimation measures provide a 
marginal WTP (i.e. compared to a baseline) for the adoption of the z attributes considered in 
the DCE for each individual. Individual characteristic and socio-economic conditions can 
play a role in explaining these WTP measures and alternative approaches are available to 
disentangle heterogeneity in preferences (e.g. Ward et al. 2016). Seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) models the n individual WTP by considering a set of z=(1,..Z) marginal 
WTP equations that are explained by the matrix of characteristics (𝑌𝑛𝑧) and their error terms 
are correlated: 
𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑛𝑧 = 𝑓(𝑌𝑛𝑧 , 𝜗𝑧) + 𝜖𝑛𝑧  
𝐸[𝜖𝑛𝑧|𝑌𝑛𝑧] = 0 
𝐸[𝜖𝑛𝑧𝜖𝑛𝑧|𝑌𝑛𝑧] ≠ 0 
 
Different individual and social characteristics can influence the matrix 𝑌𝑛𝑧. The SUR model 
efficiently accommodates the correlation across equations but not across individuals 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2005). The SUR model provides a broad understanding of factors 
influencing the adoption of CSA techniques and results can support decision makers in 
tailoring interventions to different subpopulations. 
DCEs have not been applied extensively to understand agricultural choices in Malawi. 
Waldman et al. (2017) assess the choices farmers make between annual and perennial maize-
pigeon pea intercropping systems, and how farmer characteristics affect opt-out choices. 
Ward et al. (2016) investigate the impact of subsidies on adoption of conservation agriculture 
and reveal preference heterogeneity among farmers in Malawi by assessing individual WTP 
estimates for different attributes. Marenya et al. (2014) used framed choice experiments to 
investigate whether farmers were interested in crop insurance to cope with drought risks, and 
risk aversion affected insurance uptake. Our study provides further insight into the preferred 
CSA techniques of different subgroups among rural farmers to provide recommendations for 






3.2 Discrete Choice Experiment design 
For the DCE we defined two attributes reflecting on-farm CSA techniques, two attributes that 
explained the additional yields of these techniques, an attribute indicating the temporal 
distribution of these additional yields, and one attribute reflecting a conditional payment to 
cover the adoption costs (see Table 1). Farmers were assumed to be able to assess and trade-
off the costs and benefits of these techniques over time, and thereby indicate the minimum 
compensation level they would require.  




Soy - maize 
rotation 
Groundnut - maize 
intercropping 
Pigeon pea - maize 
intercropping 




3 5 10 20 
Time until 
improvement 
1 year 2 years 5 years 10 years 
Increase in 
maize yield  
0 bags of 50kg 1 bag of 50kg 2 bags of 50kg 4 bags of 50kg 
Tree product fuelwood fruits poles  
Credit 
(MKW/year) 
5000  15000  25000  40000  
 
The first attribute was the crop diversification attribute, with four levels: soy-maize rotation, 
pigeon pea-maize intercropping, groundnut-maize intercropping and sorghum-maize 
intercropping. Soy is mostly a cash crop (Tinsley 2009), pigeon pea and groundnuts are food 
crops traded in local markets, and sorghum is a climate resistant wheat crop (Cooper et al. 
2008). The second attribute was the additional number of trees planted on the “mundas” 
(main type of plot, not riverine), varying from three to twenty trees in total. The levels of this 
attribute were based on the required 25-30 trees per hectare for achieving improved maize 
yields, and the relatively small land parcels in the area (NSO 2017a). The third attribute was 
the number of years that it would take to improve maize yields and harvest tree products, 
varying from one to ten years as reported in Garrity et al. (2010). The fourth attribute was the 
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increase in maize yields, varying from zero to three bags of 50kg per year, based on studies 
such as Kamanga et al. (2010) and Kaczan et al. (2013). The tree products included fruits, 
poles and firewood, as represented by the fifth attribute.  
The sixth attribute was the financial incentive, which was presented as a conditional annual 
credit that farmers would receive for five years, and that they would not have to pay back if 
the trees were still present on their land after five years. However, should they fail to manage 
the trees then the payments would be turned into a loan. The amounts, varying from five to 
forty thousand Malawian Kwacha (MKW) per year (EUR 7-40), were based on a calculation 
of the costs of additional labour required for the systems, and the loss of maize in initial 
years. The choice for a WTA question was not only motivated by the fact that 
implementation of the programs would impose costs on farmers in the first few years, but 
also that part of the benefits of such projects would accrue to the more distant communities 
that could potentially benefit from regulation of water flow, carbon sequestration and lower 
pressure on forests. A subsidy is coherent with the current fertiliser subsidy programme even 
if the subsidy is provided in the form of coupons. Moreover, in low-income countries, 
household budget constraints can prohibit WTP questions (Rai and Scarborough 2015). 
In the hypothetical scenario, the options would be supported by additional extension services 
to train farmers in the methods and tree caring, and seedlings as well as seeds for the new 
crop would be provided in year 1. The program would be implemented by an NGO in 
collaboration with the village development committee. The NGO would monitor and check 
the presence of the trees; the village development committee would manage the conditional 
credit scheme. 
Figure 1 presents an example of a choice card. The design for the DCE was generated using 
SAS software following procedures for a D-efficient design with non-informative priors as 
outlined in Kuhfeld (2010). The design consisted of 36 choice cards split into six versions 
(blocks). The experimental design was optimised for main effects but does not allow for the 




Figure 1. Example choice card. 
 
3.3 Pre-tests and data collection 
The methods were pre-tested in comparable villages during April 2015 with the help of 
experienced Malawian enumerators. Low levels of literacy necessitated the use of figures and 
pictograms to explain the attributes, levels, and hypothetical market. The main change made 
during the pre-tests was an increase in the level of credit, as pre-test respondents deemed the 
initial levels too low to overcome the adoption costs. 
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Data were collected from mid-June until mid-August 2015. Four trained Malawi interviewers 
conducted the interviews. The household questionnaire consisted of seven parts, including 
questions on (a) current agricultural yields, (b) forest use and revenues, (c) the choice 
experiment, (d) perceptions on the barriers, financial credit, and institutions involved in the 
hypothetical market, (e) perception on benefits of tree planting, crop diversification and forest 
conservation, (f) household characteristics, and (g) an interview assessment completed by the 
interviewer. 
Respondents were selected after a household mapping exercise in the villages. Four group-
villages were selected, with ten sub-villages in total. One group-village is located in Zomba 
District, the other three in Machinga District. The locations were chosen based on the 
distance to the town of Zomba and to the most intact part of the Zomba-Malosa forest. One of 
the group-villages was involved in the community-based forest management of this forest. In 
each group-village, fifty individual choice experiments were conducted. Participants had to 
be aged between 18 and 65 years and were selected to achieve proportional representation of 
gender and age groups, representative of the village population.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
In total, 198 respondents participated in the DCE, and 196 observations remained for analysis 
after data cleaning; descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. The number of female 
respondents was higher than male respondents. Education levels were low, with only 34% of 
the sample having completed primary schooling or above. The mean household size was 4.5. 
The average land holdings were just under 1 hectare per household and 35% of the 
respondents had only one plot.  
Households produced on average 681 kg of maize, but the skewed maize yield distribution 
implies that for a considerable proportion of the sample the farm does not produce sufficient 
food to last the whole year – on average, respondents reported that their farm produced 
enough food for 9 months of the year. Other important crops are groundnuts (with a yield of 




Almost all respondents (96%) use chemical fertiliser, but the amount of fertiliser that 
households can get or afford is low (median = 87kg/ha) in comparison to industrialised 
countries (e.g. 200 kg/ha for maize in Germany) (Roser and Ritchie 2017). The mean number 
of fertiliser coupons that households get is 0.95; village politics dictate that coupons are 
shared among families and friends irrespective of need.  
As most of the farm produce is used for domestic consumption, cash revenues from 
respondents’ farms are relatively low. Few households own a private woodlot, and mean 
woodlot revenues are negligible, but public or communal forest revenues (mainly from 
selling charcoal, bamboo, firewood and grasses) are relevant. More than half of the 
households (58%) own livestock. Within the ‘other income’ pool, the largest source is formal 
employment, with smaller contributions from charcoal trade, non-agricultural activities, 
remittances, social cash transfers and agricultural wage labour. Compared to the sample 
statistics for household cash revenues, the chosen credit levels in the DCE appear to be of the 
right order of magnitude, especially if one considers that the options would imply a 
considerable change in people’s main source of food production. 
Previous research has found that the number of relatives on which one can rely in times of 
need can have significant impact on the probability that households adopt new farming 
techniques (Kassie et al. 2015). On average, households reported that they have 2.5 
potentially supporting relatives. More than half of the sample did not trust the traders to 
whom they sold their maize and main crops. Two-fifth of the sample expected that the 
Government would help in case of harvest failure. Relevant to our DCE is also that 20% of 
the respondents had previously been involved in intercropping or crop rotation projects, and 




Table 2. Sample statistics (n=196)  




Respondent gender (proportion male)  0.45 (0.50) 
Respondent age (in years) 42 (16) 
[38.5] 
 
Respondent education primary school or 
above  
 0.34 (0.48) 
Respondent head of household   0.66 (0.48) 
Household size 4.5 (2.0) 
[4] 
 
Only 1 plot owned   0.35 (0.48) 
Number of plots 1.9 (0.88)  
Total land size (in hectares) 0.92 (0.79) 
[0.77] 
 
Maize produced (in kg) 681 (673) 
[500] 
 
No. of months that food was sufficient for 
family 
9.2 (3.4)  
Fertiliser use (in kg) 80 (57) 
[50] 
 
Number of fertiliser coupons used 0.95 (0.60) 
[1] 
 
Total number of trees on farm  18 (51) 
[4] 
 
Woodlot owned   0.12 (0.32) 
Number of livestock owned 4.2 (6.6) 
[2] 
 
Farm revenues (in MKW) 16,278 (46,828) 
[1,600] 
 
Woodland revenues (in MKW) 208 (2274) 
[0] 
 
Forest revenues (in MKW) 10,443 (54,854) 
[0] 
 
Livestock revenues (in MKW) 6,404 (26,541) 
[0] 
 
Other income (in MKW) 98,713 (220,736) 
[32,000] 
 
Number of relatives in village for support 2.5 (3.0) 
[1.5] 
 
Expecting government assistance   0.43 (0.50) 
Trust in traders   0.55 (0.50) 
Involved in intercropping/rotation 
projects  
 0.21 (0.41) 
Involved in tree planting projects   0.55 (0.50) 




4.2 Choice model results 
The opt-out rate was very low, with only 7% of choices for the current situation. The main 
motivations for choosing the opt-out were that respondents thought the options would not be 
more beneficial than their current farming practices, they would not be able to afford the 
additional labour required for the new practices, or number of trees in the options was too 
high for the size of plots owned. 
Table 3 presents the results of the mixed logit models estimated in preference-space for the 
choice data from our DCE, using R software (version 3.1.1). Because of the categorical 
attributes (cropping techniques, tree products), the baseline is a choice for an alternative with 
groundnuts and fuelwood. The alternative specific constant captures this baseline, plus a 
general propensity to choose an alternative different from the status quo. Random parameters 
with normal distributions were estimated for all attributes, and an error-component was 
included for the two options versus the opt-out. For five of the attributes, preference 
heterogeneity in our sample is significant. We opted for a parsimonious model and in the 
final model only those variables with significant heterogeneity are included as random 
parameters; otherwise they are kept fixed. 
The model results show that, as theoretically expected, the probability of choosing one of the 
CSA packages increases with higher credit levels, lower number of trees, and higher number 
of maize bags. The respondents differ significantly in their preferences for these attributes, as 
can be seen from the significant distributions of the random parameters. Moreover, the 
standard deviations are larger than the means of the random parameters: for all parameters 
there is a sign-switch within the sample.  
The posterior estimates suggest that the mean estimate for around 65% is positive as 
expected, but about 35% of the sample is estimated to prefer smaller amounts of credit 
(column 4 of Table 3). While this would be perceived as problematic (theoretically invalid) in 
WTP studies, it is reasonable in this case where the risk of not meeting the credit 
requirements (successful tree management) led to a preference for lower amounts among 
some respondents. The posterior estimates furthermore suggest that approximately 18% of 
the sample would prefer a higher number of trees rather than a lower number, and 7% would 
prefer a lower number of bags.  
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The ranking of the crops shows that groundnuts and pigeon peas are ranked highest, with 
lower preferences for sorghum and lowest for soy. The parameter estimate for pigeon peas is 
insignificant, meaning that this crop is not ranked differently from the baseline crop 
groundnuts. No significant heterogeneity was found in preferences for sorghum or pigeon 
peas when we included these variables as random parameters with normal distributions. 
However, the distribution of the random parameter of soy is significant. The posterior 
analysis of the conditional mean estimates shows that around 7% of respondents would have 
a positive preference for soy compared to groundnuts.  
The alternative specific constant has a large effect size and is significant. We expect that this 
effect, which is the opposite of a status quo bias, largely reflects the dissatisfaction with the 
current situation among smallholders in our study area and indicates a general interest in 
change. The alternative specific constant value also reflects the baseline levels of the 
dummies, i.e. groundnut intercropping and fuelwood benefits. 
Contrary to other studies, we find no significant effect for the time it takes until the yield 
increases and tree products can be harvested. Fruit trees are valued higher than trees with 
poles or firewood, but this effect is only weakly significant. Although the mean of the poles 
parameter is insignificant, the significant standard deviation of the random parameter 
suggests that respondents’ preferences for poles is heterogeneous. Together these results 
suggest that the tree products are not a dominant factor in the utility of the proposed CSA 
techniques. 
The final column of Table 3 presents the WTA estimates and their 95% confidence intervals, 
estimated by −(𝛽𝑧/𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒). Hence, positive estimates for attributes imply that respondents 
would require an incentive to adopt a package containing those attributes, such as for soy 
rotation and sorghum intercropping. The wide confidence intervals of the random parameters 





Table 3. Choice model results 





% β > 0 WTA1 
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Fixed parameters    
Alternative specific constant 4.915*** 
(0.681) 
  -93.54 
(-193.39; -45.73) 
Sorghum intercrop  -0.741*** 
(-3.503) 
  14.34 
(4.90; 30.67) 
Pigeon pea intercrop (mean) 0.080 
(0.189) 
  2.07 
(-5.12; 10.70) 
Time (in years) -0.023 
(0.018) 
  0.42 
(-0.26; 1.25) 
Fruits (mean) 0.402* 
(0.158) 







Loglikelihood -886.6    
No. Obs. 1176    
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10. N.s.=not significant. 1 Note that WTA is calculated 
as: −(𝛽𝑧/𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒), so that positive WTA estimates imply that farmers require compensation, 
while negative WTA estimates imply that farmers would be willing to pay to achieve 




4.3 Observed preference heterogeneity 
The results of the mixed logit model show considerable heterogeneity, with some respondents 
assigning positive utility changes to some of the attributes, while others express negative 
utility changes. Explaining this heterogeneity would help to understand which segments of 
the population are likely to adopt certain CSA packages. Therefore, we estimate how the 
heterogeneity in the conditional means of the random parameters of the DCE attributes are 
associated with indicators for different types of capitals (human, financial, natural, social and 
physical). We estimated a SUR model using STATA software and procedures and present the 
results in Table 4.  
The resulting pattern is diverse, with effects related to different capitals: physical (land 
ownership), social (assistance from government and relatives), financial (revenues), human 
(education, knowledge of intercropping), and natural (trees owned). Preferences for soy are 
lower among men than women; the latter may prefer the nutritional value, especially for their 
children. Owners of only one plot have a lower preference for soy than owners of multiple 
plots, which can be explained by the aversion towards soy rotation which does not provide 
maize for domestic consumption in years of soy production. Owners of only one plot also 
have a lower preference for extra number of bags; possibly, owners of multiple plots 
expected to realise the yield increase more easily. While having more supporting relatives 
was related to a lower preference for maize yield increases, higher education was associated 
with higher preferences for more maize.  
The extra number of trees, which farmers would need to maintain to avoid paying back the 
credit, shows that respondents with more plots are estimated to have a weaker negative 
preference for higher numbers of trees than farmers with fewer plots. Higher revenues (from 
livestock, agriculture, woodlands and forests) were also associated with higher preferences 
for extra trees. Respondents expecting governments to assist in times of need and those who 
had previously been involved in intercropping projects were also estimated to have more 
positive preferences towards extra trees. Preferences for poles was positively associated with 
the number of trees that respondents already owned on their plots, which may reflect a 
knowledge effect.  
Finally, the preferred credit amount was negatively associated with having more supporting 
relatives and with living in village 1. There are differences between the four villages in 
various characteristics, but none of these had a direct effect on the conditional parameter of 
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the credit amount. Several variables found to be significant in previous studies (e.g. Giller et 
al 2011; Kassie et al. 2015), such as the access to fertiliser inputs, to financial and agricultural 
markets, were not significant in our dataset.  





Explanatory variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
Soy rotation 0.03** 
(7.50) 
Gender respondent (1=male) -0.229** 0.115 
Only 1 plot owned -0.251** 0.121 






Number of relatives in village for 
support 
-0.014** 0.006 
Education level of 5 years or more 0.099** 0.038 
Only 1 plot owned -0.084** 0.039 





Expecting government assistance 0.025* 0.014 
Involved in intercropping projects 0.035** 0.017 
Revenues (log) 0.004*** 0.002 
Number of plots  0.024*** 0.008 
Constant -0.182*** 0.018 
Poles 0.04*** 
(3.94) 
Total number of trees on farm (log) 0.072*** 0.027 
Constant 0.101*** 0.062 
Credit 0.07*** 
(15.35) 
Living in village 1 -0.006** 0.002 
Number of relatives in village for 
support 
-0.001*** 0.001 
Constant 0.011*** 0.002 
Number of observations 186 
Breusch-Pagan test of independence (χ2(10)) 25.15; P=0.0051 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10. The χ2 tests of the individual regressions 
demonstrate that the models are significantly better than their constant-only counterparts; the 
Breusch-Pagan test of independence is a Lagrange multiple statistic, of which the results here 
show that the errors of the five equations are significantly correlated. For 10 respondents, 
data on the relevant characteristics were missing, so they were excluded from this analysis. 
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4.4. Implications for CSA policies: estimating conditional adoption rates of CSA 
packages 
To demonstrate the implications of our findings on the incentive payments required for 
different packages, Table 5 provides estimates of WTA and proportion of market shares for 
four different potential packages, informed by existing research on CSA in East and Southern 
Africa (Snapp et al. 2002, Kamanga et al. 2010, Sani et al. 2011, Sirrine et al. 2010, Kazcan 
et al. 2013, Carsan et al. 2014, Smith et al. 2016, Franke et al. 2018, Snapp et al. 2018). 
Package 1 is a soy rotation package, that is expected to provide fuelwood from the 5 trees, 
and improve soil fertility and therefore maize production by about 4 bags a year after 5 years. 
Package 2 is a pigeon pea package intercropped with maize, where 5 additional trees provide 
fruits and maize yields increase by 2 bags a year due to the soil improvements of nitrogen 
fixation of the pigeon peas after 5 years. Package 3 is the drought-resistant sorghum package, 
where 10 extra trees for poles are planted, and one extra maize is earned from 3 years 
onwards. Package 4 is a basic package, which provides fuelwood from three extra trees and 1 
extra bags of maize after 5 years thanks to trees improving soils. 
Firstly, the WTA estimates show that Package 2 has a negative WTA estimate (-8.86 
thousand MKW), which suggests that respondents would not require a financial incentive to 
adopt this package. We exclude the alternative specific constant from the WTA estimation. If 
Package 2 was the only option on offer, the WTA results suggest that 71% of smallholders in 
our sample would not experience a utility loss and hence not require a financial incentive. 
The WTA estimates are higher for the other packages, ranging from approximately zero 
MKW for Package 4, to 21 thousand MKW for the unpopular Package 3. If the policy 
objective is to increase soy production (Package 1), 49% of the farmers in our sample would 
require no financial incentive. However, if the policy objective is to increase farmers’ 
resilience to droughts, then either a different crop than sorghum should be offered, or 80% of 
farmers would require a financial incentive to adopt sorghum (Package 3).  
Second, if multiple packages were offered to farmers at the same time, the estimates show 
that Package 2 is ranked highest of the four packages by 61% of the respondents of our 
sample. Although intercropping pigeon peas is not valued higher than intercropping 
groundnuts, the higher number of additional bags of maize (as a result of higher expected soil 
improvements when intercropping with pigeon peas) lead to a higher ranking of Package 2 
than the other packages.  
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Noticeable from the percentage of respondents that ranked Package 1 highest is the effect of 
heterogeneity towards soy rotation package. Package 1 has a higher mean WTA than Package 
4, i.e. its adoption requires a higher financial incentive, yet more respondents rank it highest 
(26% compared to 11%). 
A further exploration of these results, informed by the SUR analysis in Section 4.3, shows 
that Package 1 is ranked highest by 31% of respondents with multiple plots, compared to only 
15% of respondents with a single plot. Respondents who own one plot rank Package 4 first 
almost as often as Package 1. Hence, if the policy objective is to include farmers with small 
land holdings, then Package 4 is important to include in a portfolio of CSA programmes. 
Finally, if the policy is to achieve a yield target for individual crops when multiple packages 
are on offer, the results show that Package 4 would have to be accompanied by an incentive 
payment of MKW 40 thousand for this Package to be ranked highest by a majority of 
respondents (more often than package 2). This shows not only that Package 2 is most popular 
on average, but also that the heterogeneity towards the incentive payment creates a need for a 





Table 5. Willingness to Accept and ranking estimates for four CSA policy packages 
 Package 1 Package 2 Package 3 Package 4 
Cropping technique Soy - maize 
rotation 









Number of extra trees 5 5 10 3  
Tree product fuelwood fruits poles fuelwood 
Increase in maize yield  4 bags of 
50kg 
2 bags of 
50kg 
1 bag of 50kg 1 bag of 50kg 
Time until 
improvement 
5 years 5 years 3 years 5 years 
 











Proportion of sample 
with positive WTA  
49% 71% 20% 63% 
Proportion of 1st ranks 26% 61% 3% 11% 
owner >1 plot 31% 59% 2% 8% 
owner 1 plot 15% 66% 3% 16% 
Incentive needed for 
highest majority rank  
52 0 135 40 
Notes: Based on Krinsky and Robb Monte Carlo simulation procedures with 2000 draws. 
WTA values and incentives are expressed in Malawi Kwacha (2015) * 1000, per farmer per 
year for a period of 5 years. 
 
4.5. Limitations 
There are some limitations to our study that affect the use of the results for further policy 
appraisal and implications for poverty and inequality reduction. Firstly, the sample size of our 
study (n=196) is too small to aggregate the findings across the wider population of the two 
sampled districts of our study (over 1 million people), as the socioeconomic and 
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agroecological conditions of two districts are more diverse than reflected in our sample. We 
therefore do not provide population level estimates of WTA. Our scenario analysis aimed to 
provide insight into the profiles of farmers that would be likely to adopt different packages, 
but not to estimate aggregate welfare estimates or adoption rates. We argue that such profiles 
provide valuable information to development practitioners who tend to operate in selected 
communities and would be able to target farmers depending on their profiles with the 
appropriate packages. 
Secondly, we expect that the high effect size of the alternative specific constant should not be 
used to assess potential adoption rates of the climate smart agriculture packages evaluated in 
this study. We expect that these estimates are subject to hypothetical bias and suggest a 
propensity to change that is much higher than observed in ex-post evaluation studies on the 
adoption of conservation agriculture and agroforestry programmes (Andersson and D'Souza 
2014, Chinseu et al. 2019).  
Thirdly, the effect of land ownership on preferences for the proposed CSA options was 
important. Our study sample included farmers with at least one plot and excluded landless 
people who would not be able to adopt the practices. CSA projects focused on-farm practices 
(rather than off-farm activities further down the value chain) may fail to reach landless 
people, who represent an estimated 16.7% of Malawi’s rural households (NSO 2017b). It was 
beyond the scope of our study to assess preferences of landless people, or for off-farm CSA 
activities. Also excluded from our sampling frame were households where the head of the 
household was younger than 18 years, such as orphaned children living alone, and 
respondents older than 65 years. These groups may be more vulnerable or poor, and whether 
CSA projects will be able to provide benefits to these groups remains an open question. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Different agricultural projects have been implemented in Sub-Saharan Africa with the aim to 
increase food production as well as smallholder wellbeing and resilience, including climate 
smart agriculture, sustainable intensification and conservation agriculture. Our ex-ante 
evaluation of different climate smart agriculture packages, using a discrete choice experiment 
among smallholders in Malawi, shows that the ‘best’ strategy depends on the objectives of 
governments and development organisations promoting CSA. Our study provides relevant 
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recommendations towards adoption of climate smart agriculture and demonstrates that land 
ownership plays a key role in the preferences of smallholders, which may also apply to other 
agricultural development programs.  
If the aim for CSA is to increase overall yields in line with SDG 2, organisations may mainly 
be interested in reaching out to as many smallholders as possible by offering the most 
attractive package. In our study, this was a package offering pigeon pea-maize intercropping 
with considerable maize yield gains. However, if the aim is to increase soy production, then 
our results suggest that farmers will require significant incentive payments to overcome the 
perceived utility losses. In the case of soy, the need for self-sufficiency in maize combined 
with the lack of market access, considerably reduced the attractiveness of soy-maize rotation 
techniques. 
However, to achieve poverty and inequality reduction in line with SDG 1 and 10, strategies 
that target relatively poorer smallholders (i.e. those with a single plot) may require different 
agricultural techniques. Farmers with multiple plots were more likely to prefer soy-maize 
rotation schemes, whilst single-plot owners preferred groundnut-maize intercropping more 
often. Groundnuts have a local market and are used for self-consumption. Tree adoption, 
often promoted to improve or maintain soil quality, is also restricted by land ownership. Our 
study hence shows that for CSA to be pro-poor, options are necessary that do not lead to 
reduced staple food yields in the short-term, irrespective of (financial) compensation or long-
term benefits. A wider CSA strategy focused on SDG 1 and 10 should also consider off-farm 
activities to involve landless community members. 
If the aim is to increase climate resilience of farmers (SDG 13) through increasing the 
adoption of crops that are more resistant to droughts, offering sorghum-maize intercropping 
packages does not appear to be an effective strategy. Low marketability, limited use in 
current diets or perhaps the stigma of a ‘poor man’s crop’ may explain this. Governments and 
development organisations may want to consider other drought resilient crops. Further 
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